Stories based on senior intelligence sources are a case in point

Stories based on senior intelligence sources are a case in point.” He did not produce further evidence to back up the story, except to say that the central allegation “fitted in to a general pattern of concern, conveyed to a number of BBC journalists with good contacts in the security services”. Broadcasting the story, he said, had been in the public interest. “It was entirely proper to reflect some unease about the presentation of the Government’s arguments in the disputed dossiers,” he said.In what appeared to be a softening of the BBC position, Mr Davies went out of his way to say that the corporation’s journalists had never accused Mr Blair of lying. He said the BBC would also review its rules on journalists writing for other publications after Mr Gilligan used a newspaper’s columns to reiterate his claims. Despite the BBC’s softer line, Downing Street continued to press for a retraction, criticising the corporation’s efforts to “defend the indefensible”. A spokesman also repeated claims that the integrity of the Prime Minister had been “attacked”.He said: “Over a month later, the BBC still haven’t answered the question, ‘Do they believe those allegations to be true, or false, yes or no?’.

When the full facts of this are set out, any reasonable person will see that they are proved to be false.”However, Robin Cook, the former leader of the Commons, accused Mr Campbell of skilfully using the row with the BBC to divert attention from claims that there was no evidence that Iraq held weapons of mass destruction. “He has managed to convince half of the media that the foreign affairs inquiry is into the origins of his war with Andew Gilligan, not into the war with Iraq,” he said in an interview with The Guardian. Referring to the disputed dossier, he added: “It clearly wasn’t accurate There aren’t any weapons ready for use in 45 minutes .. there was no nuclear weapons programme.”. The “jury is still out” on the Government’s claims about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, the cross–party Commons Foreign Affairs Committee said today. Mr Blair’s official spokesman said: “I think it’s regrettable that the BBC so far has refused to admit that the story was wrong.

That’s all we ask for today: admit the story was wrong.”He added: “The ball is now in the BBC’s court.”The spokesman also refused to accept the committee’s conclusion that Mr Blair had misrepresented to Parliament the status of the second “dodgy dossier”.The committee dound that it was wrong for Mr Campbell to have chaired a planning meeting to discuss the September dossier.No 10 refused to accept that finding too, saying it was not a meeting to discuss intelligence, but presentation.. Conclusions and recommendations of the Foreign Affairs Committee report, The Decision To Go To War In Iraq. The following are the conclusions and recommendations of the Foreign Affairs Committee report, The Decision To Go To War In Iraq.
1. We conclude that it appears likely that there was only limited access to reliable human intelligence in Iraq, and that as a consequence the United Kingdom may have been heavily reliant on US technical intelligence, on defectors and on exiles with an agenda of their own.2. We conclude that the March 2002 assessment of Iraq’s WMD was not “suppressed”, as was alleged, but that its publication was delayed as part an iterative process of updating and amendment, which culminated in the September dossier.3. We conclude that it is too soon to tell whether the Government’s assertions on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons will be borne out.However, we have no doubt that the threat posed to United Kingdom forces was genuinely perceived as a real and present danger and that the steps taken to protect them taken were justified by the information available at the time4. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes, in the light of subsequent events.5.